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ESSAY
AN ESSAY ON THE QUIETING OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW
Aaron D. Twerski†
For several decades, courts and commentators have
disagreed as to whether the standard for liability in product
design defect cases should be based on risk-utility tradeoffs
or disappointed consumer expectations. Although a strong
majority opt for risk-utility a significant minority of courts
adopt the consumer expectations test. This Essay contends
that as a practical matter in jurisdictions that allow for
recovery in design defect cases on a consumer expectations
theory, plaintiffs introduce a reasonable alternative design as
the predicate for recovery. In fifteen of the seventeen states
that allow recovery based on consumer expectations the
author could not find a single case in which the plaintiff did
not introduce a reasonable alternative design. And in all
jurisdictions but one, a defendant is free to introduce riskutility evidence as relevant to the issue of whether the
product disappoints consumer expectations. Thus, whether a
reasonable alternative design is required de jure, it is de facto
a staple in almost all design defect cases.

INTRODUCTION
Almost six decades have passed since the onset of the
modern products liability era.1 The tumult that followed the
adoption by the American Law Institute of strict liability in

† Irwin & Jill Cohen Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, Special Counsel
to Herzfeld and Rubin, P.C. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of
the law school librarian, Kathleen Darvil, to this project and to that of Carolyn
Morway (Brooklyn Law School 2019).
1 The case that abolished the requirement of privity for strict liability against
a manufacturer, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960),
written in the same year as William L. Prosser’s classic article, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960), ushered in
the new era of products liability. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A was
adopted by the American Law Institute in 1963 and quickly was adopted by
almost all jurisdictions.
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Section 402A is long behind us.2 The rules governing such
issues as crashworthiness,3 liability for products with patent
dangers,4 comparative fault,5 and responsibility of component
part manufacturers have been settled.6 Much of the hullabaloo
surrounding the Products Liability Restatement in 1998 has
faded into the past. The torrent of scholarly literature dealing
with products liability has been reduced to a trickle.7 But one
area of the law still seems to attract the interest of the courts:
the controversy as to whether liability for defective product
design should be governed by risk-utility balancing or the
consumer expectation test. In the past several years courts in

2

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
In the early years following the adoption of Section 402A, there was
controversy as to whether an automobile manufacturer had a duty to design a
car so as to minimize damages to a passenger in case of an accident. See Evans
v. General Motors, Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Indiana
law and denying liability for crashworthiness), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836, 836
(1966), overruled by Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1977);
Larsen v. General Motors, Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying
Minnesota law and recognizing a cause of action for crashworthiness). The action
for crashworthiness is now universally accepted. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODS. LIAB. § 16(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998) [hereinafter PRODS. LIAB. RESTATEMENT].
See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 17.3, at 1065 (3d ed. 2015) (“. . .
[I]t seems safe to say that the crashworthiness doctrine is now the law in every
American jurisdiction.”).
4 The “patent danger rule” immunized manufacturers from design liability
when the product’s danger was open and obvious. See, e.g., Campo v. Scofield,
95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (N.Y. 1950) (concluding that the defendants are not liable for
the plaintiff’s injury because the danger of the machine manufactured by
defendants is open and obvious), overruled by Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of
Miehle-Goss Dexter, 348 N.E.2d 571, 573 (N.Y. 1976). The Products Liability
Restatement § 2, Comments d and g reject the patent danger rule as an absolute
defense in design defect cases; obviousness of danger is one factor in deciding
whether a product should have been made safer. See OWEN, supra note 3, § 10.2,
at 610 (virtually all American jurisdictions today, while refusing to apply a patent
danger rule to design defect cases, boldly and properly apply it to “warning
claims”) and cases cited in PRODS. LIAB. RESTATEMENT § 2, Reporter’s Notes at p.
85.
5 PRODS. LIAB. RESTATEMENT § 17(a), § 1 cmt. b; see also Webb v. Navistar
Int’l Transp. Corp., 692 A.2d 343, 346−350 (Vt. 1996) (discussing the policy
reasons to apply comparative fault to products liability cases).
6 PRODS. LIAB. RESTATEMENT § 5; see also Zaza v. Marquess & Nell, Inc., 675
A.2d 620, 629 (N.J. 1996) (discussing the majority rule that component part
manufacturers are generally immune from liability when their non-defective parts
are integrated into a larger product).
7 For the years 1963–1968, the Index to Legal Periodicals showed 1,602
articles under the category of Products Liability. In the years 2012–2018, there
were only 272 academic journal articles under this category.
3
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Pennsylvania,8 Connecticut,9 Nevada,10 and Florida11 have
written lengthy opinions on the issue. The question as to
whether to make out a credible design claim the plaintiff must
prove a reasonable alternative design (RAD) lies at the heart of
the debate.12
In Part I, this Essay will very briefly review the origins of
the controversy. Part II will argue that the controversy has
been basically settled by the litigants who almost invariably
fashion design litigation with regard to the viability of a RAD.
Courts may not require a RAD but one has to look long and
hard to find cases where a RAD has not been introduced. Jury
instructions may talk consumer expectations, but the focus of
the case is RAD. Part III will explain why plaintiffs opt to
introduce evidence of a RAD in consumer expectations states.
Part IV will survey the seventeen states that allow the recovery
based on the consumer expectation test and show that in
fifteen of the seventeen there are no design cases where a RAD
was not introduced.13 Part V will discuss the two consumer
8 Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 368 (Pa. 2016), vacated and
remanded for new trial sub nom., 180 A.3d 386 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018). For a more
extensive analysis of Tincher, see infra note 62.
9 Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., 152 A.3d 1183, 1203 (Conn. 2016). For a
more extensive analysis of Bifolck, see infra note 59.
10 Ford Motor Co. v. Trejo, 402 P.3d 649, 654–58 (Nev. 2017). For a more
extensive analysis of Trejo, see infra note 55.
11 Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp., 177 So. 3d 489, 510–12 (Fla. 2015).
12 See, e.g., id. at 505 (stating the critical difference between Second
Restatement and the Third Restatement is the requirement that the plaintiff
demonstrates the existence of a “reasonable alternative design”); Tincher, 104
A.3d at 395 (“[A] product may be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user even though no feasible alternative design is available.”) (citation
omitted).
13 Four states who by statute have adopted the consumer expectation test
either by statute or judicial decision are, in reality, risk-utility states. Arkansas,
Indiana, and Utah are prime examples. For a comprehensive discussion of the
law in these states, see Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility,
74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, at 1081 n.99, 1089 n.113, 1091 nn.122–25 (2009)
[hereinafter, Twerski & Henderson, Jr., The Triumph of Risk-Utility] (outlining the
laws in Indiana, Arkansas, and Utah). In Evans v. Nacco Materials Handling
Grp., Inc., 810 S.E.2d 462, 470 (Va. 2018), the court said that liability for
defective design could be established by showing that the product did not meet
what reasonable consumers consider defective. But the court said:
Thus, while the jury could have concluded from the evidence that
the plaintiff’s proposed redesign would eliminate, or at least
reduce, the likelihood that the type of accident at issue in this case
would occur, there was no evidence from which the jury could
conclude that the plaintiff’s proposed redesign is safer overall. . . .
It may also be true, however, that operators and bystanders would
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expectation states in which there were design cases and no
RAD was introduced. It will also critique the view of one of the
states that will not allow risk-utility into evidence as relevant
to whether a product meets consumer expectations. However,
the main focus of this Essay is to tell the story as to how
products liability law has become non-controversial. It has
settled down because plaintiffs have decided for good and
sufficient reason to try design cases on the premise that the
availability of a RAD is crucial to a credible case.
I
THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSUMER EXPECTATION TEST
The consumer expectation test had its origins in two
comments to Section 402A that provide for liability to accrue:
a product must be in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer. Comment g defines
“defective condition”:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the
product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer,
which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.

Comment i defines “unreasonably dangerous”:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics.

The leading scholars writing on or about the time that
Section 402A was adopted did not envisage these comments as
relevant to design defect. Dean William Prosser writing in 1971
said:
There are . . . two particular areas in which the liability of
the manufacturer, even though it may occasionally be called
strict, appears to rest primarily upon a departure from
proper standards of care, so that the tort is essentially a

face a greater risk of injury under the plaintiff’s redesign than
exists under the current design. Thus, even if [the] plaintiff had
proved that reasonable consumers expected a design that limits
brake adjustment to a mechanic, or that makes it more difficult to
adjust the brake by requiring the use of tools, there was no
evidentiary basis for a jury to conclude that [the] plaintiff’s proposed
redesign was safer overall.
Id. at 472 (second emphasis added).
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matter of negligence.14

Prosser then goes on at length to describe design defect and
failure to warn as based in negligence.15 Over the next decade
this theme was echoed by such scholars as Dean Page
Keeton,16 Professors Gary Schwartz,17 John Wade,18 Mary J.
Davis,19 Sheila Birnbaum,20 and William C. Powers.21 As late
as 1984, the Prosser and Keeton Hornbook on the Law of Torts
made it clear that the consumer expectation test was
inappropriate as a test for design defect.22 To be sure, there
were dissenters23 but the consensus was that the consumer
expectation test would fade into oblivion.24
It did not happen. A cadre of courts insisted that they
wanted to retain the consumer expectation test since, unlike a
risk-utility test, which smacked of negligence, it was a true
strict liability test. The critics notwithstanding, the consumer
expectation test continues to live on in about seventeen

14 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 644 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote
omitted).
15 Id. at 645–48.
16 W. Page Keeton, Products Liability—Design Hazards and the Meaning of
Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 293, 310 (1979).
17 Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L.
REV. 435, 476, n.241 (1979).
18 John W. Wade, On Product “Design Defects” and their Actionability, 33
VAND. L. REV. 551, 566–67 (1980).
19 Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of
Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1236–37 (1993).
20 Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence
[to Warranty] to Strict liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 613–14 (1980).
21 William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability,
1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 665−68 (1991).
22 PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 99, at 698–99 (W. Page Keeton, et al., 5th
ed. 1984). But see Michael D. Green, The Unappreciated Congruity of the Second
and Third Torts Restatements on Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 837
(2009). Professor Green argues that both the Second and Third Restatements
recognize a strict liability consumer expectation test for products that do not meet
minimum standards of safety. Sec. 3 of the Products Liability Restatement
embodies that principle. This author is in agreement. See infra note 30. In
short, when a product fails to perform its manifestly intended function it does
not matter whether the failure results from a manufacturing defect or a design
defect. Risk-utility and RAD are important when the claim is that a product
should have been designed with greater safety.
23 See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The
ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 644 (1995) (explaining the
importance of consumer expectations to design defect claims and arguing that
courts should at least consider these expectations alongside risk-utility).
24 OWEN, supra note 3, § 8.4, at 490–91.
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jurisdictions.25 In a few states it is the only test for defect;26 in
a greater number it is an alternate test for defect, i.e., riskutility or consumer expectation.27
The cases agree, in
principle, that the consumer expectation test is limited to
“cases in which the everyday experience of the product’s users
permits a conclusion that the product’s design violated
minimum safety assumptions . . . .”28
II
IF NOT DE JURE—RAD IS DE FACTO NECESSARY TO MAKE OUT A
CREDIBLE DESIGN CLAIM
It is not the intent of this Essay to rehash the debate about
risk-utility versus consumer expectations.
My longtime
collaborator and co-reporter of the Products Liability
Restatement, Professor James A. Henderson, Jr. and this
author have written at length on this issue.29 Our position is
that to make out a classic design defect case, a plaintiff must
prove that a RAD was available at the time of sale.30 The
25 See infra notes 44–48, 51–58 (providing examples of jurisdictions that
continue to apply the consumer expectation test).
26 These include Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Maryland, and Nevada. See
infra notes 51–55.
27 These include Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington. See infra
notes 57–67.
28 Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994).
29 See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations:
Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 861, 892−935 (1983) (arguing that a consumer expectation test for design
defect, if limited to the failure of the product for core uses, is similar to res ipsa
and provides a legitimate ground for recovery); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron
D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1514 (1992) (proposing revisions to section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that prefer risk-utility calculus in design
defect claims); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus
on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 879–87 (1998) (discussing
the shortcomings of the consumer expectation test, and asserting that the riskutility standard, when accompanied by a reasonable alternative design, is the
superior standard); Twerski & Henderson, Jr., The Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra
note 13, at 1106–08 (asserting that the risk-utility test continues to be superior
to the consumer expectation test in all but res ipsa disputes). The Products
Liability Restatement reflects the views of both Professor Henderson and this
author inasmuch as we served as co-reporters on this project.
30 See supra note 29. We have throughout noted that a RAD is not required
in res ipsa like cases. See Products Liability Restatement § 3 that allows an
inference of defect “without proof of a specific defect, when the incident that
harmed the plaintiff . . . was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product
defect[. . . .]” (emphasis added). Although this inference of defect is most
frequently applied in manufacturing defect cases, § 3 cmt. b provides that
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inquiry of this Essay is whether evidence of a RAD is routinely
offered by plaintiffs in states that allow a plaintiff to proceed
under the consumer expectation test.
With very few
exceptions, the author found that—regardless of the theory
that a state follows—the plaintiff almost invariably introduces
a RAD into evidence.31 It is rare to find a design case where
the plaintiff did not do so. There are a few isolated examples,
but the issue of whether a plaintiff must introduce a RAD is
almost beside the point. If a RAD is not required de jure, it is
de facto a staple in almost all design cases.
To arrive at this conclusion, the author searched all state
cases reported under the West Key Number collecting reported
product liability design defect cases.32 The search did not
include federal diversity cases. In our 2009 article surveying
the states that had required a RAD, we counted twenty five
states that had adopted RAD as mandatory to establishing a
prima facie design defect case.33 They were obviously not the
focus of this inquiry. Instead, the author identified states that
either had committed to the consumer expectation test as the
exclusive test for design defect or had adopted the two-prong
test. Since a plaintiff had the option of proceeding under the
consumer expectation test, it was of interest to see whether the
plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of a RAD and whether
courts allowed the factfinder to consider this evidence.
The author makes no claim to have reviewed every state
design case. To limit the inquiry the search depended on the

“occasionally a product design causes the product to malfunction in a manner
identical to that which would ordinarily be caused by a manufacturing defect.”
The comment goes on to limit liability to situations in which a product fails to
perform its manifestly intended function. See, e.g., id. at illus. 1−4 (providing
hypotheticals that demonstrate situations in which products failed to perform
their manifestly intended function, versus situations in which they did not).
Courts that have adopted the consumer expectations test have also realized the
necessity of placing sensible limits on its applicability. See Soule, 882 P.2d at
308–10 (holding that the consumer expectation test must not allow a jury to
ignore risk-utility analysis, nor may it result in a verdict that is unsupported as
a matter of law); Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 743–44 (N.Y. 1995)
(discussing the utility of the consumer expectation test in considering RAD, but
noting a preference for risk-utility).
31 See infra Part IV.
32 The West Key Number is 313A k126.
33 Twerski & Henderson, Jr., The Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 13, at
1080. Wisconsin, originally classified as a consumer expectations state, has now
adopted a RAD test for design conflict cases as set forth in Products Liability
Restatement § 2(b). See infra note 56 (detailing Wisconsin’s adoption of a RAD
requirement).
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West classification in its key numbers. And, as noted earlier,
federal diversity cases were not analyzed. Nor did the author
provide elaborate citation to the cases in which the plaintiffs
introduced a RAD. Having identified the states covered in this
research, the notes in the margin will simply state that having
read the cases in consumer expectation states none were found
that in which a RAD was not introduced. The author invites
any reader to check the research and confirm the veracity of
my claim. One important caveat must be noted: in cases where
defect is derived from the application of res ipsa, a RAD is not
presented. Almost always these are manufacturing defect
cases for which no RAD need be established.34 Occasionally,
design language appears in the case and the West Key
Numbers may have included such a case. Cases alleging defect
in drug design cases are also omitted. These are not classic
design cases and are irrelevant to this survey.35
III
WHY IS EVIDENCE OF RAD ALMOST ALWAYS INTRODUCED IN
CONSUMER EXPECTATION STATES
Why would a plaintiff, in states that provide the option of
proving a design defect by alleging a plaintiff friendly consumer
expectation test, take the trouble to engage expensive experts
to demonstrate to the jury that an alternative design would
have been safer?
Four significant reasons support the
ubiquitous presence of a RAD in design litigation:
(1) The consumer expectation test is vague and
non-specific. A RAD points to a specific element of
the design and seeks to convince the jury that had
34 See, e.g., J.M.F. Trucking, Inc. v. Carburetor & Elec. of Lewiston, Inc., 748
P.2d 381, 390−91 (Idaho 1987) (requiring no RAD where a truck engine caught
fire and the plaintiff relied on a res ipsa theory of recovery); Pagnotta v. Beall
Trailers of Oregon, Inc., 991 P.2d 728, 732–33 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (requiring
no RAD where a truck trailer detached from a truck and the plaintiff relied on a
consumer expectation/res ipsa theory of recovery).
35 The standard for liability in drug design cases has been the subject of great
controversy. Courts have articulated eight different tests for drug design liability.
See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Design Liability: Farewell
to Comment k, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 521, 542–43 (2015). Furthermore, there is
almost unanimous agreement that courts are institutionally incapable of
administering a RAD test for drugs. Id. at 544–48; see also Lance v. Wyeth, 85
A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. 2014) (echoing the sentiment that the proposition of a RAD is
not feasible in drug cases). For an article suggesting that drug design claims are
now subject to federal preemption, see Aaron D. Twerski, The Demise of Drug
Design Litigation: Death by Federal Preemption, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 281, 303–04
(2018).
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that feature been incorporated into the design of the
product the plaintiff would not have, for example,
suffered the loss of a hand or would not be a
quadriplegic. This is a far more compelling story
than “my expectations of product performance were
disappointed.” The consumer expectation test is
bland; the availability of a RAD is vibrant.
(2) RAD being a negligence concept points the finger at
the defendant and says that for a minimum outlay
of funds the defendant could have saved the client
from serious injury. In most jurisdictions, recovery
for pain and suffering is open-ended.36 The greater
the fault the greater the likelihood the jury will
impose significant damages. 37
The consumer
expectations test is fault neutral. It speaks not to
the defendant’s conduct or product but to the
plaintiff’s expectations.
(3) In preparing for trial, plaintiff’s counsel cannot be
sure that the product design is so clearly defective
that it fails to meet a consumer’s minimum
expectations as to safety.
Plaintiffs must be
prepared for the very real possibility that a court will
deny them a “consumer expectations” instruction
after the completion of the case. 38
(4) As courts have noted, consumers have a right to

36 See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON
TORTS 855 (2d ed. 2015) (explaining that “[a]wards for pain are not easy to
evaluate because there is no objective criterion for judgment”).
37 See Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products
Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 874
(2002). The authors conclude that use of negligence terminology rather than
strict liability was more likely to result in jurors’ willingness to award any
damages; when awards of damages were made, they were greater when
negligence was the theory presented to them. Thus, a negligence instruction may
improve the plaintiff’s chances both in terms of imposing liability and receiving a
higher damages award. See also Paul D. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of
the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 531 (1974), which notes
that “[m]ore plaintiffs would prefer to present their respective cases to a jury on
a negligence, rather than a strict liability, basis.
In
McLuenesque
terms
negligence is ‘hot’ and strict liability is ‘cold.’ It is easier to prevail by showing
that the defendant did something wrong than that there is something technically
defective about the product.”
38 See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 310 (Cal. 1994)
(reasoning that in some cases the consumer expectation test was unworkable as
a stand-alone theory of liability); Lamke v. Futorian Corp., 709 P.2d 684, 686
(Okla. 1985) (holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a sufficiently
defective design such that a reasonable consumer would expect alternative
outcomes).
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expect well-designed products.39
Thus the
availability of a RAD gives support to the claim that
the product disappoints legitimate expectations of
the consumer.
This argument appears to be
duplicitous since the test for whether a RAD should
have been adopted is viewed from the perspective of
the hypothetical reasonable person not the
reasonable manufacturer. Nonetheless, the desire
to assure that juries keep the perspective of the
reasonable consumer in mind in deciding whether a
RAD should have been adopted is not without
merit.40

Given the ubiquitous presence of RAD evidence in design
defect cases in almost all jurisdictions regardless of whether
they require a RAD or not, the question arises as to whether
the role of RAD is discussed in jury instructions. In consumer
expectation states, are jurors told about RAD or risk-utility
balancing? Defendants regularly ask for instructions that
focus the jury on risk-utility, and in “consumer expectation”
states they are denied.41 How significant is the lack of
instruction on risk-utility? It is the author’s surmise that lack
of instruction to the jury is of, some, but not monumental
significance. Once the plaintiff has introduced a RAD into
evidence based on the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony as to its
practical feasibility and the defendant has countered with its
experts, the jury’s attention is directed to whether the product
under scrutiny was reasonably safe. It is the proverbial
“elephant in the room.” An interesting example of this
phenomenon arose in Soule v. General Motors Corp.42 In that
39 See, e.g., Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp., 177 So.3d 489, 511 (Fla. 2015)
(emphasizing the manufacturer’s power to direct consumer expectation through
product portrayal and advertising, and reasoning that this power may justify a
greater duty to meet consumer expectations); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d
806, 808 (Or. 1967) (en banc) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 395 cmt.
f, 402A) (“The user has the right to expect a reasonably safe design and
reasonable quality controls in fabrication according to that design.”); Tincher v.
Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 402–03 (Pa. 2016) (noting that consumers have
a right to expect products that are safe for normal use); Hamilton v. Motor Coach
Indus., Inc., 569 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (“The consumer has a
right to expect that he will receive from the manufacturer a product that is safe.”).
40 OWEN, supra note 3, at 512; Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d
774, 774–79 (Wash. 1975).
41 See, e.g., Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353, 361 (Kan. 1982)
(denying the plaintiff’s request for a risk-utility jury instruction in Kansas); Ford
Motor Co. v. Trejo, 402 P.3d 649, 652 (Nev. 2017) (denying the plaintiff’s request
for risk-utility jury instruction in Nevada).
42 See Soule, 882 P.2d at 298.
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case, the plaintiff suffered serious injury to her ankle when her
GM Camaro was struck by another car at closing speed on
impact from 30 to 70 miles per hour.43 The plaintiff alleged
defective design of the toe pan as the cause of her injuries and
introduced expert testimony in support of her claim. GM’s
experts disputed the claim of design defect.44 The trial judge
gave a consumer expectations instruction.45 The jury awarded
$1.65 million in damages.46 On appeal the California Supreme
Court held that it was error to give a consumer expectations
instruction because “[a]n ordinary consumer of automobiles
cannot reasonably expect that a car’s frame, suspension, or
interior will be designed to remain intact in any and all
accidents.”47
Nonetheless, the court found that it was
harmless error to give the consumer expectation instruction
because almost all the evidence focused on the differing expert
evaluations of “the strengths, shortcomings, risks, and
benefits of the challenged design, as compared with a
competitor’s approach.”48
Furthermore, the defendant is free to argue the safety or
lack thereof of the alternative design. If the RAD is admitted
into evidence, the defendant must be free to challenge the RAD
and to argue that the challenged design is safer than the
alternative or that it would not be economically feasible to
adopt it.49 Thus, the argument noted earlier that consumers
expect well-designed products makes comment by counsel
relevant even in a consumer expectation state. Very simply,
once risk-utility considerations are admitted into evidence the
likelihood that a consumer expectation instruction will have a
significant impact on the result is, in the author’s opinion, not
great. To be sure, when plaintiffs are denied the consumer
expectations instruction they seek reversal.50 The consumer
expectations instruction frees the plaintiff from bearing the
burden of proof on the risk-utility issue and is thus more
43

Id. at 301.
Id. at 302.
45 Id. at 303.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 310.
48 Id. at 311.
49 See Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp., 177 So. 3d 489, 511 (Fla. 2015).
50 See, e.g., McCabe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 308–09
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (appealing the trial court’s ruling that the customer
expectation test for defective design was inapplicable to the circumstances in the
case).
44
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favorable to her. Nonetheless, the defendant is certain to argue
risk-utility to the jury and the case is likely to be decided on
those grounds.
IV
CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS AND THE UBIQUITOUS RAD IN
EVIDENCE
Five states defined defect based solely on the consumer
expectations test: Kansas,51 Nebraska,52 Oklahoma,53

51 The seminal cases adopting the consumer expectations test in Kansas are
Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353, 361 (Kan. 1982) and Barnes v. Vega
Indus. 676 P.2d 761, 764 (Kan. 1984). In both cases, the Kansas Supreme Court
held that a jury should be instructed on consumer expectations alone. In both,
plaintiffs introduced a RAD. In Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 940 (Kan.
2000), in answering a certified question from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
1999 WL 458626 (10th Cir. Jan. 19, 1999), the court reiterated that Kansas was
committed to the consumer expectation test, but said, “we also recognize the
validity of risk/utility analysis as a guide in determining the expectations of
consumers in complex cases.” Delaney, 999 P.2d at 944. The court further said
it would allow “evidence of the feasibility of an alternative design in the trial of a
design defect.” Id. at 945. In reviewing all reported state design defect cases, the
author found none in which the plaintiff failed to introduce a RAD into evidence.
52 Nebraska adopted the consumer expectation test in Rahmig v. Mosley
Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 79 (Neb. 1987) and further held that the plaintiff need
not prove a RAD in order to make out a prima facie case of design defect. In
reviewing all state design defect cases post-Rahmig, the author has found none
in which the plaintiff did not introduce a RAD. Indeed, in Rahmig, the plaintiff
introduced evidence of a RAD. Id; see also Pitts v. Genie Indus., Inc., 921 N.W.2d
597, 607 (Neb. 2019) (RAD offered); Jay v. Moog Auto., Inc., 652 N.W.2d 872,
879–80 (Neb. 2002) (RAD offered); Kudlacek v. Fiat S.p.A., 509 N.W.2d 603, 612
(Neb. 1994) (RAD offered).
53 Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1362 (Okla. 1974), is the
lead case adopting the consumer expectations test for design defect. In reviewing
the Oklahoma design defect cases, in each instance the plaintiff offered a RAD
that would have avoided the harm. See, e.g., Attocknie v. Carpenter Mfg., 901
P.2d 221, 222 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995) (RAD offered); Stewart v. Scott-Kitz Miller
Co., 626 P.2d 329, 330 (Okla. Civ. App. 1981) (RAD offered). It is interesting that
in two cases the defendant was granted summary judgment, even though the
plaintiff had offered a RAD, because the court found that the product did not
disappoint consumer expectations. Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 765 P.2d
770, 774 (Okla. 1988) (RAD offered but was found not to have made a tanker
more safe under the consumer expectation test than when fire was fed by gasoline
spill while the plaintiff was filling the tanker); Lamke v. Futorian Corp., 709 P.2d
684, 686 (Okla. 1985) (fire caused by cigarette where design claim was that
chemicals were added to make the cigarette burn longer).
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Maryland,54 Nevada,55 and Wisconsin56 until 2015. In these
jurisdictions in each reported state case the plaintiff
introduced a RAD into evidence and there was no mention in
the case that the introduction of a RAD was improper.

54 Maryland adopted the consumer expectation test in Halliday v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1147–48, 1158 (Md. 2002). In that case, a threeyear-old boy shot himself while playing with his father’s handgun. The boy’s
father disregarded virtually every one of the warnings intended to prevent
children from accessing the gun. The Plaintiff suggested a host of alternative
designs that would have reduced the likelihood that a young child could fire the
gun. The court embraced the consumer expectation test as a shield against
liability and absolved the gun manufacturer of liability. The Maryland case law
pre-Halliday held that design defect cases were to be decided on risk-utility
grounds. In all of the design cases, the plaintiff introduced a RAD. See, e.g.,
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nave, 740 A.2d 102, 107 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (RAD
offered); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 539 A.2d 701, 707 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988) (RAD offered); Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 488 A.2d 516, 519–20 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (RAD offered). There is a paucity of state case law in
Maryland post-Halliday. Nonetheless, in all design cases that the author has
been able to find, plaintiffs introduced a RAD.
55 In Ford Motor Co. v. Trejo, 402 P.3d 649, 655 (Nev. 2017), the court
rejected the defendant’s request for a risk-utility (RAD) jury instruction in a case
where the issue was the strength of the roof of a SUV in a roll-over situation. In
a lengthy opinion, the court held that a RAD was not necessary in a design defect
case and that Nevada adhered to the consumer expectation test. Id. at 655–57.
The court said that the availability of a RAD was one factor to be taken into
account in deciding whether a product’s design met consumer expectations. Id.
at 653–54. A search of all Nevada design defect cases reveals that in all the cases
the plaintiff presented evidence of a RAD. That a RAD is not a formal requisite
does not alter the fact that plaintiffs deem a RAD necessary to make out a credible
design defect case. Indeed, in Trejo, extensive evidence was introduced by both
parties as to whether a RAD was technologically and economically feasible. Id.
at 657–58.
56 As of 2011, Wisconsin requires proof of a RAD when a claimant alleges a
design defect. WIS. STAT. § 895.047(1)(a). Up to that time, Wisconsin adhered
to the consumer expectation test. See, e.g., Morden v. Continental AG, 611
N.W.2d 659, 667 (Wis. 2000) (manufacturer liable for negligent design and RAD
offered); Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 331 N.W.2d 585, 588–89 (Wis. 1983)
(RAD offered); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230
N.W.2d 794, 796, 798 (Wis. 1975) (RAD offered); Arbet v. Gussarson, 225 N.W.2d
431, 434 (Wis. 1975) (RAD offered); Derby v. Brenner Tank, Inc., 522 N.W.2d
274, 275 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (RAD offered). Despite holding that a RAD was not
required, in Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 18 (Wis.
1984), the plaintiff introduced a RAD and the court found that evidence
supported the availability of a RAD. Similarly, in Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP,
Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Wis. 2001), the plaintiff alleged the presence of highprotein latex powder in the latex gloves that caused her to suffer a serious allergic
reaction. The plaintiff introduced evidence that low-protein latex gloves would
have been effective without causing allergic reactions. Id. at 733–34. Although
the court held that the consumer expectation instruction was correct, the fact
remains that the plaintiff introduced evidence of a RAD. Id. at 759. In short, no
Wisconsin design defect case from 1975 to present was found in which the
plaintiff failed to introduce a RAD.
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Although the cases often say that the plaintiff need not
introduce a RAD, the trier of fact had before it the RAD. Twelve
states allowed the plaintiff to proceed either under the
consumer expectations test or risk-utility: Alaska,57 Arizona,58

57 The lead case in Alaska adopting the two-prong test is Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 876 (Alaska 1979) (RAD offered); see also, Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Alaska 1998) (RAD offered); Dura
Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 401 (Alaska 1985) (RAD offered). No design case
was found in which the plaintiff did not introduce a RAD.
58 Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 709 P.2d 876, 878–80 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) is the
leading case adopting the two alternative tests for design defect consumer
expectation and risk-utility. The court acknowledged that “while the consumer
expectation test may sometimes work well in design defect cases, it provides no
resolution for those cases in which ‘the consumer would not know what to expect
. . . .’” Id. at 878. (citations omitted). A review of the cases reveals that in all
design defect cases plaintiffs introduced a reasonable alternative design. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Nissei ASB Mach. Co., 3 P.3d 1088, 1093 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)
(RAD offered); Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Mfg. Co, 655 P.2d 32, 34 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982) (RAD offered). Although the Arizona courts continually make reference to
the consumer expectations test as appropriate to some design defect cases, the
author could find no design defect case in which a RAD was not introduced into
evidence.
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Connecticut,59 Hawaii,60 Illinois,61 Pennsylvania,62 New York,63
59 Connecticut adopted the two-prong test for defect in several lengthy
opinions. See Izzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136 A.3d 1232, 1235 (Conn.
2016); Bifolck v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 152 A.3d 1183, 1188–89 (Conn. 2016);
Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1326 (Conn. 1997). In each of
the cases, the plaintiff alleged defective design, and in each the plaintiff
introduced evidence of a RAD. The author found no case since 1997 in which
the plaintiff did not introduce a RAD. The consumer expectation test has been
limited in that “the product must fail to meet legitimate, commonly held,
minimum safety expectations . . . .” Bifolck, 152 A.3d. at 1203.
60 Several Hawaii cases embrace the two-prong test for design defect: (1)
consumer expectations and (2) risk-utility. In each case the plaintiff offered a
RAD. See, e.g., Acoba v. Gen. Tire, Inc., 986 P.2d 288, 304 (Haw. 1999) (RAD
offered); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc. 659 P.2d 734, 742 (Haw. 1983) (RAD
offered); Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 618 P.2d 267, 272 (Haw. 1980) (RAD offered);
Wagatsuma v. Patch, 879 P.2d 572, 580 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (RAD offered). No
design case was found in Hawaii in which the plaintiff did not offer a RAD.
61 The leading case on design defect in Illinois is Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor
Co., 901 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 2008). In that case the plaintiff sought to proceed solely
on the consumer expectation test. Id. at 348. The defendant wanted the court
to apply risk-utility balancing. Id. The question for the court was whether the
consumer expectation test “trumped” risk-utility. Id. at 352. The court said:
Although we have declined to adopt section 2 of the Products
Liability Restatement as a statement of substantive law, we do find
its formulation of the risk-utility test to be instructive. Under
section 2(b), the risk-utility balance is to be determined based on
consideration of a “broad range of factors,” including . . . the
nature and strength of consumer expectations regarding the
product, including expectations arising from product portrayal and
marketing,” as well as “the likely effects of the alternative design
on production costs; the effects of the alternative design on
product longevity, maintenance, repair and esthetics; and the
range of consumer choice among products” . . . . We adopt this
formulation of the risk-utility test and hold that when the evidence
presented by either or both parties supports the application of this
integrated test, an appropriate instruction is to be given at the
request of either party. If, however, both parties’ theories of the
case are framed entirely in terms of consumer expectations,
including those based on advertising and marketing messages,
and/or whether the product was being put to a reasonably
foreseeable use at the time of the injury, the jury should be
instructed only on the consumer-expectation test.
Adoption of this integrated test resolves the question of whether
the answer to the risk-utility test “trumps” the answer to the
consumer-expectation test because the latter is incorporated into
the former and is but one factor among many for the jury to
consider.
Id. (citations omitted). For a full analysis of Mikolajczyk, see Twerski &
Henderson, Jr., The Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 13, at 1073–1077. The
practical effect of that decision is that if the plaintiff seeks to proceed under the
consumer expectation test, the defendant can introduce risk-utility evidence and
the jury will be given the integrated instruction. The defendant will invariably
argue that the product under consideration meets the risk-utility standard. The
only way for the plaintiff to rebut is to introduce a reasonable alternative design
to demonstrate that the defendant’s claim is not valid. It is no surprise that post-
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Mikolajczyk there is no design case in which the plaintiff did not introduce a RAD.
Pre-Mikolajczyk, the Illinois courts applied the consumer expectation test. There
also appear to be some cases where the courts applied both consumer expectation
and risk-utility analysis tests. See Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249,
256 (Ill. 2007) (“[T]his court has continued to employ these two tests [consumer
expectation and risk-utility] when determining whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous.”) (citing Blue v. Envtl. Eng’g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128 (Ill.
2005); Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35 (2002) (“separately
analyzing whether an IV catheter connector was unreasonably dangerous under
the consumer-expectation and risk-utility tests”); see also Lamkin v. Towner, 563
N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1990) (“A plaintiff may demonstrate that a product is
defective in design . . . in one of two ways: (1) by introducing evidence that the
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or (2) by introducing
evidence that the product’s design proximately caused his injury and the
defendant fails to prove that on balance the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such designs.”); Dunham v. Vaughan &
Bushnell Mfg., 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ill. 1969) (considering both consumer
expectation and risk-utility analysis). Nonetheless, in the overwhelming majority
of cases, plaintiffs introduced a RAD. See, e.g., Rios v. Navistar Int’l Transp.
Corp., 558 N.E.2d 252, 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (RAD offered); Cornstubble v. Ford
Motor Co., 532 N.E.2d 884, 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (RAD offered); Hayes v. Kay
Chem. Co., 482 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (RAD offered).
62 Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 335 (Pa. 2016), is the seminal
Pennsylvania case adopting the two-prong test for defect. Tincher overruled the
much-maligned Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co. case. See Azzarello v. Black Bros.
Co., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978), overruled by Tincher, 104 A.3d. Tincher, on its
facts, alleged a design defect. 104 A.3d at 339. It is not clear from the decision
whether the plaintiff on remand would be able to make out a case under the
consumer expectations test. At trial both parties put in extensive evidence on
risk-utility tradeoffs and the plaintiff clearly proffered a reasonable alternative
design. Id. at 338. An examination of state cases citing Tincher reveals that in
all classic design defect cases the plaintiff introduced a RAD. See, e.g., Dunlap
v. Fed. Signal Corp., 194 A.3d 1067, 1068, 1071 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (RAD
offered); Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Martinez, 2017 WL 1400968 at *2, *8 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2017) (RAD offered); Webb v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., L.L.C., 148 A.3d 473, 476
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (RAD offered). The author could not find a design case in
which a RAD was not introduced. The only case in which a RAD was not
introduced, High v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 154 A.3d. 341, 351 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017), is probably not a design case. In that case, plaintiffs were injured when
exposed parts of their bodies came into contact with wet caustic cement and
sought to recover under the consumer expectation test. The court noted that the
design claim (defective cement) appeared to be a failure to warn claim.
63 The premier case on design defect liability in New York is Voss v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 205 (N.Y. 1983). In a lengthy opinion, the court
set out multiple factors to be taken into account in making a risk-utility
assessment in an action based on strict liability in tort. In Denny v. Ford Motor
Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 733 (N.Y. 1995), the Court of Appeals held that in an action
based on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c)),
a plaintiff could establish a case for design defect if the product fails to meet “the
expectations for the performance of the product when used in the customary,
usual and reasonably foreseeable manners.” Id at 736 (footnote omitted). In an
article by Paul D. Rheingold & Scott D. Kagan, How to Prove the Defect in a New
York Product Liability Case, BILL OF PARTICULARS, no. 1, 2014, at 37, the authors
declare that the “most significant hurdle for a plaintiff seeking to prove defect in
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the design of a product is the requirement that under New York law, the plaintiff
must demonstrate a reasonable alternative design [RAD]”. Failure to do so will
result in summary judgment for the defendant. See, e.g., Preston v. Peter Luger
Enters., Inc., 858 N.Y.S.2d 828, 832 (App. Div. 2008) (affirming summary
judgment for the Defendant because the Plaintiff failed to produce a RAD);
Rypkema v. Time Mfg. Co, 263 F.Supp.2d 687, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting
motion to dismiss for failure to produce a RAD); Stalker v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 874 N.Y.S.2d 632, 635 (App. Div. 2009) (noting failure to produce a
RAD); Sabater ex rel. Santana v. Lead Indus. Ass’n., 704 N.Y.S.2d 800, 805 (Sup.
Ct. 2000) (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the negligent product
design claims); Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc., 199 F.Supp.2d 53, 84, 88–
90 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (reviewing the authority on the necessity of a RAD); see also
Twerski & Henderson, Jr., The Triumph of Risk-Utility, supra note 13, at 1093
n.139 (“A substantial number of decisions set forth the requirement of a
reasonable alternative design as a prerequisite for a prima facie case of defective
design.”); Michael Hoenig, The Law of Manufacturing and Design Defect Liability,
in 1 NEW YORK STATE BAR ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1 (Goldberg & Freedenberg eds.,
2019); NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION § 2:200 (2018 ed.).
Several years later, in an article entitled An Overlooked Weapon in Product
Liability Lawsuits, 90 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 21 (May 2018), Rheingold laments the
fact that the plaintiff’s bar has not made use of the consumer expectations test
in design defect cases and cites several cases where New York courts have found
a design defect based on failed consumer expectations. The first is Bradley v.
Earl B. Feiden, Inc., where the New York Court of Appeals held that it is sufficient
that a defect in a new refrigerator caused a fire and there is no need to specify
the defect. 864 N.E.2d 600, 602 (N.Y. 2007). That case is almost identical to
Speller ex rel. Miller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 N.E.2d 252, 255 (N.Y. 2003)
(cited by the court in Bradley) where the court relied on RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3. One can draw a circumstantial inference of defect (res
ipsa) where a product fails to perform its manifestly intended function without
proof of specific defect. Miller, 790 N.E.2d at 254–55. In any event, that case
does not speak to design defect since the court says that the case involves a
manufacturing defect. The second, Duval v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., No. 1:13CV-4270-6H 2015 WL 4522911, at *3, *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2015), is a design
defect case in which the plaintiff pled both strict liability and breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability. The plaintiff introduced credible evidence of a RAD
and the court denied summary judgment on both causes of action, holding that
under the consumer expectation test a RAD was not necessary. Id. at *3–4. The
third, Wojcik v. Empire Forklift, Inc., 783 N.Y.S.2d 698 (App. Div. 2004), the court
held that even absent a RAD a court could find that a product was defectively
designed because it failed to meet consumer expectations as to its safety. Id. at
700. After reviewing every reported state design defect case in the twenty-three
years post-Denny in which the plaintiff alleged strict tort liability and/or the
implied warranty of merchantability, only in Wojcik was a RAD not introduced.
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64 OR. REV. STAT. §30.920 (2007) adopts section 402A, including comments
a through m, as the law governing products liability in Oregon. In McCathern v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 329–30 (Or. 2001), the Oregon Supreme Court
said that it was bound by the legislative determination set forth in section 402A,
comment I (consumer expectations test). The court then said:
Plaintiff acknowledges that evidence related to risk-utility
balancing of that kind may be necessary to show that a product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would have
expected. However, plaintiff disputes the Court of Appeals’ holding
that, under the consumer expectations test, a plaintiff must
introduce such evidence. See McCathern, 985 P.2d at 811 (proof of
safer practicable alternative design essential to consumer riskutility theory). According to plaintiff, evidence related to risk-utility
balancing, as described above, is required only under the nowdefunct reasonable manufacturer test. See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 577 P.2d 1322[, 1326–27] (Or. 1978) (relying on Phillip’s
reasonable manufacturer test; requiring that, when risk-utility
balancing and proof of design alternative are necessary, proof
must include evidence that alternative design was practicable).
We agree that evidence related to risk-utility balancing, which may
include proof that a practicable and feasible design alternative was
available, will not always be necessary to prove that a product’s
design is defective and unreasonably dangerous, i.e., that the
product failed to meet ordinary consumer expectations. However,
because the parties did not dispute that evidence related to riskutility balancing was necessary in this case, we leave for another
day the question under what circumstances ORS 30.920 requires
a plaintiff to support a product liability design-defect claim with
evidence related to risk-utility balancing of the kind discussed
above.
McCathern, 23 P.3d at 331–32 (footnotes omitted).
In McCathern and in all subsequent design cases in Oregon, the plaintiffs
introduced a RAD. See Benjamin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 61 P.3d 257, 268 (Or.
Ct. App. 2002). No design case was found in which a RAD was not introduced
by the plaintiff into evidence. For a discussion of McCathern, see James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Product Design Liability in Oregon and the
New Restatement, 78 OR. L. REV. 1 (1999); see also Purdy v. Deere & Co., 386
P.3d 2, 8 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
65 Tennessee adopted a two-pronged test for defective design in Ray ex rel.
Holman v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Tenn. 1996). The two tests are (1)
the consumer expectation test and (2) the prudent manufacturer test. Id. at 530–
31. The prudent manufacturer test requires risk-utility balancing. Id. at 531–
32. In reviewing all the Tennessee appellate decisions (both in the Intermediate
and Supreme Court), we found none in which the consumer expectation test
played a decisive role. In other words, all the cases that relied on the consumer
expectation test were classic res ipsa cases that would have been decided the
same way under Section 3 of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. See Jackson
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800, 802–03 (Tenn. 2001) (resolving a classic
res ipsa case of seatbelt breaking when auto collided at a speed of 19–23 mph
with a tree). If the case did not warrant a Section 3 inference of defect, the plaintiff
was required to present a reasonable alternative design. See, e.g., Brown v.
Crown Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268, 276 (Tenn. 2005) (RAD proffered for standup forklift without escape door and issue of unreasonable danger for the jury);
Shoemake v. Omniquip Int’l, Inc., 152 S.W.3d 567, 573 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)

TWERSKI ESSAY FORMATTED

2020]

QUIETING OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW

119

Florida.68 Prior to 2005, Ohio was in this camp.69 Here, too,
(where the plaintiff used forklift capable of lifting 10,000 pounds as a lift for
himself and claimed that the lift was defective in design because it did not have
a personnel-lift attachment, court made mention of and then ignored the
consumer expectation test and found that the plaintiff did not provide sufficient
evidence of a reasonable alternative design and granted summary judgement to
the defendant).
66 By statute Washington provides for liability for defective design if there
was a reasonable alternative design, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.030(a) (West
1998), or if the product failed consumer expectations, § 7.72.030(c)(3) (implied
warranty). Almost all the Washington cases cite to the two-pronged test for
defect. See, e.g., O’Connell v. MacNeil Wash Sys. Ltd., 409 P.3d 1107, 1114
(Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (“In order to show that a product was unreasonably safe
because of its design or lack of warnings, a plaintiff may rely on the risk-utility
test . . . or the consumer expectations test.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Thongchoom v. Graco Children Prods. Inc., 71 P.3d 214, 217 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003) (“Two alternative tests may be used to establish that a product was not
reasonably safe as designed: the risk-utility test and the consumer expectations
test.”); Bruns v. PACCAR, Inc., 890 P.2d 469, 474 (Wash Ct. App. 1995) (“A
plaintiff may demonstrate [design defect] by using either a risk-utility analysis or
a consumer expectation standard.”). For the most part in design cases, plaintiffs
offer a RAD. See O’Connell, 409 P.3d at 1115; Soproni v. Polygon Apartment
Partners, 971 P.2d 500, 503, 506 (Wash. 1999) (en banc); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor
Co., 683 P.2d 1097, 1098 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); Anderson v. Dries & Krump
Mfg., 739 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987); Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 576 P.2d 426, 428 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). The few cases that allege defect
design and do not set forth a RAD are cases that would be covered under the
PROD. LIAB. RESTATEMENT § 3, cmt. b. See, e.g., Pagnotta v. Beall Trailers of Or.,
Inc., 991 P.2d 728, 734 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (“[W]e conclude the consumer
expectation rule applies here to avoid summary judgment as expert testimony of
the exact defect is not required as a matter of law.”); Bruns, 890 P.2d at 476
(“When it is shown that a product failed to meet the reasonable expectations of
the user the inference is that there was some sort of defect, a precise definition
of which is unnecessary.”). The comment specifically provides that one may draw
an inference of defect in a design defect case if the product fails to perform its
manifestly intended function. Both of the cited cases fall into that category. See
also Higgins v. Intex Recreation Corp., 99 P.3d 421, 424 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding that snow tube that propels user backward down a snow-covered hill at
30 mph has low social utility and high risk of serious injury). This product would
be covered under PROD. LIAB. RESTATEMENT § 3, cmt. e (product with low social
utility and high risk may be defective without proof of a RAD).
67 See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305 (Cal. 1994); Barker v.
Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978); discussion infra at note 71 to 83.
68 See Aubin v. Union Carbride Corp., 177 So. 3d 489, 512 (Fla. 2015). It
should be noted that in the overwhelming majority of Florida cases the plaintiff
proffered a RAD. See, e.g., Sta-Rite Indus., v. Levey, 909 So. 2d 901, 908 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (RAD offered); Gen. Motors Corp. v. McGee, 837 So. 2d 1010,
1017 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (RAD offered); Brown v. Glade & Grove Supply,
Inc., 647 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (RAD offered); Hyundai
Motor Co. (Korea) v. Phillip, 639 So. 2d 1064, 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(RAD offered); Stazenski v. Tennant Co., 617 So. 2d 344, 345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (RAD offered); LeMaster v. Glock, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1336, 1337 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (RAD offered).
69 Liability for defective design is governed by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
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almost without exception, plaintiffs introduced a RAD in every
reported state case. California allows the plaintiff the twoprong test option.70 However, if the plaintiff proceeded under
the consumer expectation test alone, the defendant cannot
introduce risk-utility evidence to rebut the plaintiff’s claim that
the product disappointed consumer expectations.71
V
THE EXCEPTIONAL CASES–CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS WITH NO
RAD
In two states, California and Florida, there are indeed
several cases where plaintiffs did not introduce a RAD where
there was an allegation of design defect. Many of these cases
involved asbestos.72 It does not require extensive citation to
2307.75(F) (West 2005) that became effective in 2005. It provides:
A product is not defective in design or formulation if, at the time
the product left the control of its manufacturer, a practical and
technically feasible alternative design or formulation was not
available that would have prevented the harm for which the
claimant seeks to recover compensatory damages without
substantially impairing the usefulness or intended purpose of the
product.
Whether a product is defective in design is to be determined by a risk-benefit test
set forth in § 2307.75(A)–(C).
A prior version of the statute, § 2307.75(A)(2), allowed a plaintiff to recover if
the product design did not meet consumer expectations. See Civil Procedure–
Tort Reform Act, 2001 Ohio Laws File 26, § 2307.75(A)(2) (2001). Under the
revised version of the statute consumer expectations is one of many
considerations to be taken into account in undertaking a risk-benefit analysis.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(B)(5). Thus, there is no longer a stand-alone
consumer expectation test for design defect. Even under the previous statute,
the author could not find a design case where the plaintiff did not put into
evidence a RAD. See, e.g., Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 572
(Ohio 1981) (RAD offered); Zigler v. Avco Corp., 846 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2005) (RAD offered).
70 See supra note 67.
71 See infra notes 72−84.
72 See Baeza v. Special Elec. Co., B264220 2016 WL 7387226, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 21, 2016); Saller v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 151, 157
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Garza v. Asbestos Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 359, 360–61 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008); Cunningham v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc., 2008 WL 4966519, at *1
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2008); Jones v. John Crane, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144,
148 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr.
2d 580, 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Morton v. Owen-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 40
Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 22–23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Sparks v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 38 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 739, 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). It is interesting to note that Florida
adopted the consumer expectation test in an asbestos case. See Aubin, 177 So.
3d at 510.
The Aubin court acknowledged that under the PROD. LIAB.
RESTATEMENT § 2, cmt. e, a RAD is not required if a product is “manifestly
unreasonable” in that “the extremely high degree of danger posed by its use . . .
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make the point that asbestos is not just another products
liability case. Courts have held manufacturers of asbestos to
a standard that is sui generis.73
California appears to differ from almost all jurisdictions in
one significant manner. They have taken the position that a
plaintiff, by basing her claim entirely on consumer
expectations, can prevent the defendant from introducing riskutility evidence to show the jury that its product is, in fact,
safer than any other alternative. The source for this view stems
from Soule v. General Motors Corp.,74 a case that sets forth the
parameters of the two-prong test for defect in California. The
court said that if a plaintiff is successful in establishing that a
product failed the consumer expectation test, “[t]he
manufacturer may not defend a claim that a product’s design
failed to perform as safely as its ordinary consumers would
expect by presenting expert evidence of the design’s relative
risks and benefits.”75 In a telling footnote to the above
statement, the court said:
For example, the ordinary consumers of modern
automobiles may and do expect that such vehicles will be
designed so as not to explode while idling at stoplights,
experience sudden steering or brake failure as they leave
the dealership, or roll over and catch fire in two-mile-perhour collisions. If the plaintiff in a product liability action
proved that a vehicle’s design produced such a result, the

so substantially outweighs its negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable
person, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use . . . the product.”
Thus, rejection of RAD in asbestos cases is quite understandable.
73 For example, New Jersey held asbestos manufactures liable for risks that
were scientifically unknowable at the time the defendant distributed this product
in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982). The
court retreated from that position in Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 388
(N.J. 1984), holding that its decision in Beshada was limited to asbestos only.
Similarly, the economic loss rule which has been widely adopted throughout the
country does not apply to asbestos cases. See PROD. LIAB. RESTATEMENT § 21,
cmt. e. The author does not seek to imply that in California and Florida the
consumer expectation test is limited to asbestos cases. However, in the more
classic design cases, plaintiffs have regularly offered a RAD in evidence. See, e.g.,
Pannu v. Land Rover N. Am., Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 605, 612–13 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011) (offering a reinforced roof structure as a RAD in an SUV design case);
Gordon v. Nissan Motor Co., 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 778, 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (RAD
offered). Similarly, in most Florida design cases plaintiffs have introduced a RAD.
See supra note 68.
74 Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308–09 (Cal. 1994). The twoprong test for design defect was originally propounded in Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co.,
573 P.2d 443, 455–56 (Cal. 1978).
75 Soule, 882 P.2d at 308.
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jury could find forthwith that the car failed to perform as
safely as its ordinary consumers would expect, and was
therefore defective.76

Since Soule, the California courts have struggled with the
question as to what facts support legitimate consumer
expectations as to product performance.77
A recent case demonstrates the problem. In Romine v.
Johnson Controls, Inc.,78 an injured driver brought suit against
Nissan when, as a result of the force of collision with her car,
the seat back collapsed causing her head to strike the vehicle’s
back seat rendering her a quadriplegic. The collision causing
the plaintiff’s injury was only one of a series of chain collisions
brought about when a third-party driver slammed at high
speed into a car stopped in traffic on a freeway exit ramp. In
affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court said that
“[c]onsumers have expectations about whether a vehicle’s
driver’s seat will collapse rearward in a rear-end collision,
regardless of the speed of the collision.”79 The defendant argued
unsuccessfully that the consumer expectations test was
inappropriate for such a violent collision since there are no
expectations as to how a seat will perform in such a violent
crash.80 The defendant also sought to introduce risk-utility
evidence to show that any alternative seat would be less safe
and the seat as designed provided the optimum level of safety.81
The court, relying on Soule, denied them the opportunity to do
so. The bottom line from that holding is that consumers have
a right to expect that an automobile manufacturer would
produce a car that in actuality provides less danger and greater
safety than the car that is the subject of litigation.82 Most

76

Id. at 305 n.3.
See, e.g., Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 451 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that the consumer expectations test applies when an airbag
inflated in a low speed collision forcing the plaintiff’s arm to strike the windshield;
the defendant, auto manufacturer cannot defend risk-utility grounds); Pruitt v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (finding consumer
expectations test does not apply on facts similar to Bresnahan).
78 Romine v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 208, 213 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2014).
79 Id. at 219–20 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 220.
82 The author was consulted by the defendant in a similar California case
dealing with the ability of a seat to withstand a high-speed collision. Gueffroy v.
Audi AG, No. 34-2013-00146684 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.) (dismissed August
15, 2016). It is worth noting that the defendants sought to introduce a poll
77
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courts that embrace the consumer expectations test disagree
and will allow a defendant to introduce risk-utility evidence as
relevant to consumer expectations.83
In short, except for California, whether a RAD is required
or not, the reality is that the availability of a RAD will become
the crucial determinant for prosecuting a successful design
defect case. In the overwhelming majority of cases, plaintiffs
will make the RAD the central focus of their cases. And even
if they don’t, defendants will introduce the lack of availability
of a RAD in defense to the consumer expectation claim of the
plaintiff.84
undertaken by Daniel M. Oppenheimer of UCLA seeking to determine whether
consumers actually have expectations about seat performance in a 50-mph
collision. The study concluded consumers do not appear to have true beliefs or
expectations about how a car seat will behave in such a high-speed collision. A
copy of the study is available from the author of this article. The California trial
court did not rule on the admissibility of the study since the case was settled.
See Notice of Conditional Settlement, Gueffroy, No. 34-2013-00146684, ROA No.
354.
83 See, e.g., Aubin v. Union Carbide, Corp., 177 So. 3d 489, 511 (Fla. 2015).
While we conclude that the Third Restatement’s risk utility test
and establishment of a reasonable alternative design mandate are
not requirements for finding strict liability, we note that nothing
precludes the plaintiff in proving his or her case from showing that
alternative safer designs exist—or for that matter precludes the
defendant from showing that it could not have made the product
any safer through reasonable alternative designs.
Id. (emphasis added);
The consumer expectations test is that standard in Kansas for
determining whether a design defect exists. However, we also
recognize the validity of risk/utility analysis as a guide in
determining the expectations of consumers in complex cases. In
Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., [694 A.2d 1319 (Conn.
1997)], the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the consumer
expectations test but authorized the incorporation of risk utility
factors to help the jury in its determination of what an ordinary
consumer would reasonably expect. [694 A.2d at 1333–34]. The
Potter court quoted the Supreme Court of Washington in SeattleFirst Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (Wash. 1975): “In
determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary
consumer, a number of factors must be considered. The relative
cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the
claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or
minimizing the risk may be relevant in a particular case. In other
instances the nature of the product or the nature of the claimed
defect may make other factors relevant to the issue.
Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 944 (Kan. 2000); see also Mikolajczyk v.
Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 352–53 (Ill. 2008) (holding that when risk-utility
evidence is introduced by either party the jury should be instructed on riskutility, which includes consumer expectations as one factor).
84 It is worth noting that four decades ago Dean Page Keeton addressed this
issue. He said:
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A decade ago, on the tenth anniversary of the Products
Liability Restatement, Professor Henderson and the author
wrote an article heralding “The Triumph of Risk Utility.” The
author stands behind their research that a majority of states
demand a RAD as a requirement to make out a prima facie
case of design defect. Now, one decade later, one can say with
confidence that whether courts demand a RAD or not is of
minor importance, for whatever theory a court adopts the case
will be decided on whether there was a reasonable alternative
design available.

It is quite clear that to the extent that a maker knows, or in the
exercise of ordinary care should know, of a risk or hazard that
users may not discover or appreciate, liability results for breach of
the duty to disclose what a reasonable person would disclose. This
ground of liability protects users and consumers to a considerable
extent from harm resulting from unappreciated dangers. It is
submitted, however, that an inquiry as to whether the danger in
fact of the design outweighed the benefits of the design would
better protect users and consumers, without placing an undue
burden on manufacturers and suppliers. The court’s primary
justification for the retention of the contemplation test is the ease
with which the plaintiff can establish a design defect under this
test by circumstantial evidence. If a claimant proves that a product
fails under circumstances the ordinary purchaser or user would
not have expected, a case has been made. That is clearly so, but
the question is, should it be so? I think not. If the court would
permit the defendant to show under a risk-utility analysis by way
of rebuttal that it would not be feasible, then the position would be
supportable.
W. Page Keeton, supra note 16, at 310 (footnotes omitted).

